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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should review the record de novo in a
light most favorable to Celia.

Jurisdictional issues which

overlapped issues on the merits should have been reserved
until after trial, to avoid dismissing on the merits under
the guise of determining jurisdiction.
Celia's

briefs

furisdiction

have
with

carefully
specific

marshalled

citations

the

evidence

on

to the

record.

The evidence reveals that Goldwyn has substantial

contacts with Utah arising out of his role as medical monitor. He trained a Utah doctor to perform liquid silicone
injections, drafted the form used to explain the risks of
silicone injections to Celia, approved Celia's admission to
the silicone experiment, and monitored her treatment.
The ASPRS also has substantial contacts with Utah.
It is a joint sponsor or administration with Dow of the
liquid silicone experiment.
the

ASPRS

selected

Utah

As part of the administration,
as

a

site

f.or liquid

silicone

injections and chose a Utah doctor to perform the injections.
Further, as joint administrators of a multi-state silicone
experiment, the ASPRS and Dow should be considered
single entity for jurisdictional purposes.

as a

Because of these

contacts, jurisdiction over Goldwyn and the ASPRS is fair and
reasonable.

POINT I
(REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT I)
CELIA'S BRIEF CONTAINS
METICULOUS CITATIONS TO THE RECORD
Respondents Goldwyn and the ASPRS assert that the
trial

court

should

be

summarily

affirmed

becauou

failed to factually support her contentions on ^ u*al
citations to the record."
Issues, p. 1.)

"Celia
with

(Respondents' Brief, Ciatement of

Actually, Celia's brief contains a. least 30

citations to the record to support her facts.

Those which

were not supported by a specific citation were fa:ts
seemed indisputably obvious to Celiafs counsel.

which

For example,

the statement that "Celia received the experimental scries of
liquid silicone injections from Woolf" is not suppoitsd by a
specific citation to Dr. Woolf's deposition, R.1813, p. 6970.

Nevertheless, Celia can add record citations to support

the obvious and undisputed.

Attached as Exhibit A to this

brief is the Statement of Facts from Celia's opening brief,
with additional record citations*•
Defendants' objection is also defective in that it
fails to specify which of Celia's

facts they contend are

•'•For the Court's convenience, Celia has moved for leave
to include Exhibit A in a substitute opening brief, to avoid
the necessity of referring back and forth between the briefs.
2

unsupported.

This

general, non-specific

objection

seems

designed to invite the Court to search Celia's brief for
possible

unsupported

facts.

However, that

belongs to defendants' counsel.

job properly

Having failed to make a

specific objection, this Court should assume that defendants
have found no significant facts that are without support in
the record.

POINT II
(REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' BRIEF, P. 10-12)
THIS COURT SHOULD ACCEPT CELIA'S
EVIDENCE AS TRUE AND REVIEW THE TRIAL
COURT'S DISMISSAL FOR ERROR
Celia pointed out that an appellate court reviews
de novo a determination of prima facie jurisdiction.

Ten

Mile Industrial Park v. Western Plains Service Corp., 810
F.2d 1518 (10th Cir. 1987).

Goldwyn and the ASPRS do not

clearly dispute this standard, and fail to cite or discuss
Ten Mile.

Two Utah cases cited by Goldwyn and the ASPRS

support Celia's point-

Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics

Corp., 548 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976) states that this Court does
not reverse a trial court's determination unless "plaintiff
has shown that it [the trial court] was in error."

In other

words, this Court reviews the trial court's determination for
3

"error," not abuse of discretion or some other standard.
Andf in Gate Rental Co. v. Wheeler & Co., 549 P.2d 707 (Utah
1976),

the

Supreme

Court

apparently

accepted

plaintiff's

evidence (as stated in its brief) as true for purposes of the
appeal.

This

is

consistent

authorities cited by Celia.

with

the

numerous

federal

(Appellant's Brief, p. 13.)

Thus, this Court should review the record de novo in a light
most favorable to Celia.

POINT III
(REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT II,A)
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE
DECIDED WHETHER GOLDWYN AND THE ASPRS "CAUSED" CELIA'S
INJURIES
Utah has jurisdiction over foreign defendants v;ho
cause

injury within this state.

24(3) 2 .

Utah Code Ann. §78-27-

Celia alleged that Goldwyn and the ASPRS caused her

injuries in Utah in several ways.
First, Celia claims the consent form inadequately
disclosed

known

risks

of

(Appellant's Brief, p. 10.)

liquid

silicone

injections.

Dr, Woolf testified he simply

^Because Celia relies on §78-27-24(3), respondents'
argument that they have never done buisness in Utah (§78-2724(1)) or owned property in Utah (§78-27-24(4) or contracted
to supply goods and services in Utah (§78-27-24;2) ) is
irrelevant.
4

read

the

R.1813.)

consent

form

to

Celia.

(Woolf

depo., p. 59,

The only disclosure which the consent form makes is

that surgical removal may be required if Celia's boay "does
not

tolerate"

silicone.

(Consent

form, paragraph 2(e),

R.1811, Celia Anderson depo., Exhibit 1.)

The word 'toler-

ate" appears to be a euphemism for "severe chronic inflammatory

reaction",

injections.

a

well-known

risk

of

liquid

(Rule 56(f) Affidavit, R.1590.)

silicone
While the

consent form states that surgical removal is a possibility,
it leaves out the fact that "once silicone has been injected
into

tissue, it cannot

evacuated

be wholly

or even

in good part

by incision into the injected site."

depo., R.1812, Exhibit 4, p. 26; see also R. 1608.)
could

readily

find

that the consent

form

fails

(Rathjen
A jury
to meet

federal standards which require disclosure of "the hazards
involved."

21 C.F.R. §130.37(h)(1967).

A jury could also

conclude that Celia's injury was "caused" by the inadequate
consent form.
Second, Celia claims that Goldwyn should not have
admitted her to the experimental liquid silicone injection
program.

Admission to the experimental program was limited

to "the most severe cases of . . . 1ipodystrophy3."
^Loss of facial fat.

(Rathjen

(Goldwyn depo., R. 1810, p.20).
5

depo. Ro 1812, Exhibit 3, p. 25.)
testified

that

her

lipodystrophy

However, Celia's doctor
was

"relatively

mild*"

(Leonard depo., R. 1811, p.70). Goldwyn has admitted that he
reviewed Celia's facial photographs before admitting her to
the experiment-

(Goldwyn depo., R.1810, p. 30-34.)

If, in

fact, Goldwyn should not have admitted Celia to the experiment, a jury could conclude that his negligence

"caused"

Celia's injuries in Utah.
Celia pointed out that a plaintiff should not have
her

case

dismissed

on

the merits

jurisdictional determination.
143,

149

(10th

Cir.

1965).

under

the

guise of a

Schramm v. Oakes, 352 F.2d
(Appellant's

Brief, p. 18).

Defendants have failed to answer this point, and apparently
concede it.
The issue of whether Goldwyn or the ASPRS "caused"
injury in Utah under §78-24-24(3)) is identical to the issue
of proximate cause on the merits.

When the trial court

decided that Goldwyn and the ASPRS did not "cause" Celia's
injury under §78-27-24(3), Celia was deprived of a jury trial
on the merits of her case.
was

intertwined

with

Because the jurisdictional issue

the

merits

of

Celia's

case,

the

jurisdictional determination should have been reserved until
after trial on the merits.
6

depo. R. 1812, Exhibit 3, p. 25.)
testified

that

her

lipodystrophy

However, Celia's doctor
was

"relatively

mild."

(Leonard depo., R. 1811, p.70). Goldwyn has admitted that he
reviewed Celia's facial photographs before admitting her to
the experiment.

(Goldwyn depo., R.1810, p. 30-34.)

If, in

fact, Goldwyn should not have admitted Celia to the experiment, a jury could conclude that his negligence

'caused'

Celia's injuries in Utah.
Celia pointed out that a plaintiff should not have
her

case

dismissed

on

the merits

jurisdictional determination.
143,

149

(10th

Cir.

1965).

under the

guise of a

Schramm v. Oakes, 352 F.2d
(Appellant's

Brief, p. 18).

Defendants have failed to answer this point, and apparently
concede it.
The issue of whether Goldwyn or the ASPRS "caused"
injury in Utah under §78-27-24(3)) is identical to the issue
of proximate cause on the merits.

When the trial court

decided that Goldwyn and the ASPRS did not "cause" Celia's
injury under §78-27-24(3), Celia was deprived of a jury trial
on the merits of her case.
was

intertwined

with

Because the jurisdictional issue

the

merits

of

Celia's

case,

the

jurisdictional determination should have been reserved until
after trial on the merits.
6

POINT IV
(REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT II,B)
BECAUSE GOLDWYN HAS SUBSTANTIAL
CONTACTS WITH UTAH, IN PERSONAM
JURISDICTION OVER HIM IS PROPER
1.

Goldwyn Voluntarily Assumed "Continuing Obligations" to
Celia in Utah.
In

defendant

personam

"has

jurisdiction

created

'continuing

is

proper

obligations'

himself and residents of the forum- . ."

where

a

between

Burger King Corp.

v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476; 105 S.Ct. 2174; 85 L.Ed.2d
528 (1985) citing Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339
U.S.

643, 648

(1950).

Goldwyn asserts that he has

meaningful relationship" to Celia and Utah.

"no

The facts in the

records however, belie that claim.
Goldwyn created a substantial obligation TO Celia
when he assumed the duty of deciding whether to admit her to
an experimental medical program.

As Dr. Woolf testified,

[Goldwyn] was the only one who made the
decision whether there was medical
necessity for [Celia's] injection.
(Woolf depo.f

R.1813, p.

29.)

This decision was not a

procedural formality; before admitting Celia to the program,
Goldwyn reviewed Celia's medical history, her photographs,
reviewed the consent form, her patient information form, her
laboratory data, and her x-rays.
7

(Goldwyn depo., R.1810, p.

30-34.)

Having assumed the responsibility of making the

decision, he had a duty and obligation to use reasonable care
in doing so.
Goldwyn quibbles whether to use the word "conclude"
or "diagnose."

(Respondents' Brief, p. 15-16.)

He asserts

that he "never diagnosed [Celia] but merely reviewed medical
information in Massachusetts."

(Id. p. 16.)

Goldwyn fails

to explain why he was reviewing the medical information,
namely,

to

make

an

independent

professional

judgment

(diagnosis) whether to authorize a Utah doctor to inject a
Utah patient with an experimental medical treatment.
Goldwyn further suggests that it is critical for
jurisdictional purposes to determine whether he had a doctorpatient relationship with Celia.
15.)

Celia disagrees.

bureaucrat,

or

(Respondents' Brief, p.

Whether Goldwyn was a doctor, lawyer,

something

else,

he

assumed

a

duty

and

obligation to Celia to properly admit her to the experiment.
Goldwyn's obligation to Celia did not end once he
admitted Celia to the experiment.

Dow's letter to the ASPRS

states that Goldwyn ". . . [m]ust be available to answer
inquiries from investigators
que.

.

."

(Rathjen's

relative to problems, techni-

letter,

R.

1628, Paragraph

3.)

Further, Goldwyn was "to be the initial contact relative to
8

complications,"
submission

to

(Ld. at Paragraph 4) and was to "review any
the

efficiency. • . "

FDA

relative

to

clinical

safety

and

(_Id. at Paragraph 10).

The clinical protocol also provided for an ongoing
monitoring obligation:
H.

Adverse Reactions

All adverse reactions occurring during
the study should be reported on the Gross
Clinical Observation Sheet (See Appendix
H) . Unexpected or unusually severe adverse reactions will be reported to the
medical monitor and sponsor immediately
by telephone so that action can be taken
and adverse reaction reports rendered to
the FDA (Form 369) (See Appendix J ) .
I.

Monitoring of this Program

At regular intervals throughout the
scheduled three-year duration of this
program, a representative of the
sponsor's monitor team will visit all
investigators to review case report forms
and other corresponding portions of the
patient's original office medical
records.
These inspections are for the
purpose of verifying adherence to the IND
protocol
and the completeness and
accuracy of the data being entered on the
report forms.
(Rathjen depof R. 1812, Exhibit 3, p. 32). (Emphasis added).
In response, Goldwyn points
respondence" with Woolf.
to

1652).

to his

"scant cor-

(Respondents' Brief, p. 15; R. 1633

In light of his monitoring

9

obligation, Celia

regards this as evidence of negligence, not lack of jurisdiction.
2.

Goldwyn Had Other Substantial Contacts with Utah*
Goldwynfs

first

Celia's treatment.
the

faculty

Dean

Arbor, Michigan.

Utah

contact

occurred

prior to

One of his duties as monitor was to "be
for the training

program"

held

at Ann

(Rathjen's letter, R. 1628, paragraph 11.)

Goldwyn taught the doctors (including Woolf) what the patient
selection

criteria

were,

and

how

(Goldwyn depo., R. 1810, p. 60-62.)

to

inject

silicone.

At least by this time,

Goldwyn knew he was training a Utah doctor who would inject
Utah patients in Utah.

Goldwyn had a duty to use due care in

that training program.
Goldwyn also helped draft the consent form used to
secure Celia's consent.
Not only was

it

(Rathjen depo., R.1812, p. 106.)

foreseeable

that the doctors

(including

Woolf) might use it, they were required to use it.

(Woolf

depo., R. 1813, p.27).

Further, Goldwyn was required to

ensure that the patients

(including Celia) had signed it,

(Goldwyn depo., R.1810, p. 30 "I had to be sure the patient
[Celia] had signed the consent form").

Under these cir-

cumstances, Goldwyn cannot claim to be surprised that the
Utah doctor he trained

(Woolf) used the consent
10

form he

drafted to secure consent from a Utah patient (Celia).

The

reliance Woolf and Celia placed on the consent form cannot be
characterized
suggests.

as

"random" or

"fortuitous," as Goldwyn now

Nor are Goldwyn's contacts with Utah "unintention-

al"; each contact of Goldwyn's came about through conscious
action.
Goldwyn also urges that he should be absolved of.
contact with Utah because the consent form was actually given
to Woolf by Dow.

(Respondents' Brief, p. 19.)

Adopting this

logic would insulate any manufacturer, securities promoter
or other defendant from liability so long as someone else
actually distributes the misleading owner's manual, prospectus or other document.

Such a rule would rob Utah citizens

of important protection of Utah courts.
Goldwyn also argues that there is "absolutely no
factual support for the allegation that. . .the consent form
was the source of Celia's injury."
20.)

(Respondents' Brief, p.

This is a restatement of defendants' prior argument

that they did not "cause" injury in Utah.

See Point III,

supra.
Goldwyn also suggests that the consent form is not
a jurisdictional contact because Goldwyn owed Celia "no duty
to obtain informed consent."
11

(Respondent's Brief, p. 21,

22).

This argument is raised for the first time on appeal

and should not be considered now.
Draper

Bank

Furthermore,

& Trust,
the

717

"duty"

P.2d

issue

Insley Mfg. Corp. v.

1341, 1347
goes

to

(Utah

1986).

the merits, i.e.

whether Celia has stated a claim against Goldwyn.

However,

this Court cannot rule on the merits if it has no jurisdiction.

Cf. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682; 66 S.Ct. 773; 90

Ed. 939 (1946);

("it

is well settled that the failure to

state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the
merits and not for dismissal for want of jurisdiction.")
Goldwyn also overlooks an important factual point:
he may not have had a duty to obtain in formal consent
himself, but he certainly had a duty to properly draft the
consent form used by Woolf to obtain informed consent.
Goldwyn raises the spectre of limitless jurisdiction over "secretaries, printers, or others . . ."if this
Court
p.21).

finds

jurisdiction over him.

(Respondents' Brief,

Again, he overlooks the obvious factual distinction

between himself and others.
content of the consent form.

Goldwyn was responsible for the
His secretaries, printers and

other assistants had no responsibility for content.

In an

analogous setting, those who are responsible for the content
of a securities

prospectus
12

are subject

to liability and

jurisdiction, where the printer who prints the prospectus is
obviously not^.

Jurisdiction over the drafter of the consent

form used by Celia is fair and proper.

POINT V
(REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT II,C)
JURISDICTION OVER THE ASPRS IS PROPER
BECAUSE IT JOINTLY ADMINISTERED AN
INTERSTATE MEDICAL EXPERIMENT
1.

The ASPRS Was a Joint Sponsor of the Silicone Experiment •
The ASPRS was a joint sponsor of an inter-state

silicone experiment that included
patients•

a Utah doctor and Utah

Arthur Rathjen^ testified:
Q. Do you remember what was said on
the subject of who would be the sponsor
of the FDA, who would be the sponsor of
the study?
A.
The discussion [with the ASORS
in Los Angeles 1 was centered around the
fact that Dow Corning was not going to be
the sole sponsor of the study and that it
would be a combined sponsorship of the
ASPRS and Dow Corning.

4

A prospectus warns investors of risk to their money; a
consent form warns patients of risk to their bodies.
5

Director of Dow Corning Services to Medical Research.
(Rathjen depo.f R. 1812, p.5).
13

Q. Well, look at Page 4, item D-2.
Does that refresh your recollection of
what was said on the subject of who would
be the sponsor?
A.
No.
Although it appears as
though we were a single sponsor, we were
not the single sponsor. We made it clear
that we wouldn't be. We had an obligation with the FDA because of the fact
that an NDA had been submitted and that
our records on the material were on
record in Washingtonf and therefore, we
had an obligation to communicate and
coordinate with the FDA. But it had to
do with the material and not the
sponsorship or the study as taking sole
responsibility for the study.
(Rathjen depo.f R. 1812, p. 101-102.)

(Emphasis added).

Rathjen explained the roles of the ASPRS and Dow in
the study as follows:
Q.
Well, in that regard, can you
tell me your understanding of what the
duties and responsibilities of the
American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons are as opposed to the
duties and responsibilities of Dow
Corning with respect to the 1978
amendment to the IDE? You say it was a
joint study?
A.
The ASPRS chose the medical
monitor, the ASPRS chose the 25 investigators, the ASPRS looked into the
subject of patient consent form, the
ASPRS looked into the subject of
institutional review by the individual
investigators, the ASPRS took on the
responsibility of the liaison through the
ISPAC Committee, and the ASPRS would help
assume responsibility in attempting to
get the clinical data from the inves14

tigators. And if there were any changes
in the clinical investigators, anybody
dropped out, anybody had any difficulties, why they would take care of their
own, that it was not Dow Coming's
responsibility to administer or police
the plastic surgeons.
The ASPRS would
police their own. And that may not be a
right word to use "police," but what I
mean is to coordinate or administer or
work with to see that all of the
responsibilities were carried out.
Q.
Now, if ASPRS was going to do
all of that, what was Dow Coming's
responsibility with respect to the 197 8
amendment to the IDE, your share of the
responsibility?
A. Coming's responsibility was the
collection and the depository of the
records, taking the photographs and
duplicating them, keeping the files on
the patients that were administered into
the study, keeping the records of ampules
and the shipments of MDX4-4011 to the
individual investigators and complying
with the regulations set forth by the FDA
in conducting a study.
(Rathjen depo. R.1812, p. 102-103.)
Goldwyn,

the

medical

(Emphasis added).
monitor,

gave

testimony:
Q.
Was the application for permission
to conduct a clinical study a joint
application by Dow Corning and the
society, or was it just Dow Coming's
application?
A.
The FDA was aware that it was a
three-pronged thing — the FDA, ASPRS,
and Dow Corning — so that the FDA had
spoken at the American Society of Plastic
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similar

Surgeons' meeting. I don't know how the
original form went in, but everyone in
the American Society expected that it
involved the American Society, Dow
Corning and the FDA.
We did not think we were working for
Dow Corning and not for the FDA. Almost
everyone in that study really did it
because we were members of ASPRS.
The minutes prepared by the ASPRS (R.1672) indicate
that ASPRS agreement was required on:
(a)

Consent form (Paragraph 12);

(b)

Medical monitor selection (Paragraph 8(a));

(c)

Investigator

[doctor]

selection

(Paragraph

- 8(b));
(d) All

pertinent

documents,

manuals,

forms

(Paragraph 12));
(e) Any

publicity

regarding

the program

(Para-

graphs 7(d) and 10(a)).
In

conclusion,

the

testimony

of

Rathjen

and

Goldwyn, considered with the minutes of the meetings between
Dow and the ASPRS (Exhibits A, B and C to Celia's opening
brief)6 clearly belie the post facto claim of the ASPRS that
6

The ASPRS's objection to consideration of these
documents is tucked away in a footnote on p. 33 of its brief.
It claims a "standing objection" to the documents. However,
this "standing objection" was first raised on appeal. By
failing to object below, it has waived its objection (if
16

it merely had a "gratuitous advisory role regarding certain
aspects of the protocol. . ."
The evidence

(Respondents' Brief, p. 25.)

is that the ASPRS was a co-sponsor and co-

administrator with Dow of the liquid silicone study.
2.

The ASPRS Clearly Directed its Activities at Utah.
Jurisdiction is proper where a foreign defendant's

activities

"are purposefully directed

another state."

Asahi Metal Ind. v. Sup. Ct. of Sonoma City,

U.S.
(1987).
silicone

The

toward residents of

, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 1033, 94 L.Ed.2d 92
ASPRS

experiment)

clearly
toward

directed
Utah

its

activity

residents.

The

(the
ASPRS

specifically selected Dr. Woolf to inject silicone for the
Salt Lake area.

Dr. Woolf testified:

. . .Since we were doing a major part of
the pediatric surgery, I was asked by Dr.
Muskrave who was then president of the
Society of Plastic and Reconstructive
Surgeons if I would accept that position
for this part of the Intermountain
States.
(Woolf depo., R.1813, p. 6-7.)
chose

the Salt Lake

The ASPRS also specifically

area as a site

for liquid

silicone

injections:
any).
Hobelman Motors, Inc. v. Allred, 685 P.2d 544 (Utah
1984).
Since the witnesses necessary to authenticate the
documents are adverse, and not available to Celia, she would
simply have filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit to keep them in the
record (had there been an objection).
17

7.

In a very general and noncommitted way, Dr. Peterson and
Dallas Whaley made a first
attempt to identify areas/regions that might be considered
for location of investigators.
This list included:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Portland/Seattle
San Francisco
Los Angeles
San Diego.
Phoenix/Tucson
Salt Lake City
*

*

*

(ASPRS minutes, R.1670)(emphasis added).

In light of this

evidence, the ASPRS' claim that "there is no purposefully
established
(Respondents'

relationship
Brief, p.

between
38)

[it]

and

is mistaken.

this
The

forum"
evidence

indicates a conscious, purposeful direction of the silicone
experiment to include Utah.
3.

The ASPRS Helped Draft the Consent Form.
The ASPRS claims it did not draft the consent form.

(Schedler Affidavit, Paragraph 4, R.1444.)
did not prepare the consent form.
42-43.)

However,

Rathjen

Goldwyn claims he

(Goldwyn depo., R.1810, p.

testified

that

the ASPRS

Goldwyn prepared the consent form:
Q.
Now,
Corning was
half of the
do?
What

you've testified what Dow
to do, now tell me the other
coin. What was the ASPRS to
was their scope of respon-

18

and

sibility
form?

with

respect

to

the

consent

A. I testified this morning, I believe I
testified this morning, to the best of my
recollection, that the subject of the
informed patient consent [form] was to be
prepared or was prepared by Dr. Goldwyn
and by members of the ISPAC Committee of
the ASPRS with recommendations submitted
by some of our investigators and by our
legal counsel at Dow Corning. And that
it, to the best of my recollection, was
put into a form, a draft, if you will, by
Dr. Goldwyn and circulated around. And
when it was approved, it came back to me
and I had it typed up.
(Rathjen depo., R.1812, p. 105-106.)
The trial court was

(Emphasis added.)

faced with a clear factual

dispute whether the ASPRS helped draft the consent form.
This issue overlaps the liability question (who drafted the
consent form) and thus, should not have been decided at the
jurisdictional stage.

See Point III, supra.

consent form is an added contact with Utah.

Further, the
The ASPRS knew

Utah would be a site for silicone injections because the
ASPRS selected Salt Lake City and Dr. Woolf to do injections.
Thus, it helped prepare a consent form it knew would be used
in Utah.
ASPRS argues that because its arrangement with Dow
lacked all the elements of a profit-making joint venture, it
cannot be considered "a jural entity" with Dow for jurisdic19

tional purposes.

Cf. Aigner v. Bell Helicopters, Inc. 86

F.R.D. 532 (N.D. 111. 1980)formal partnership
jurisdiction.

or

However, the presence of a

joint venture

is not essential to

In exercising jurisdiction:

". • . courts have focused on the
realities of the relationship in question
rather than the formalities of agency
law.
Galgay v. Bulletin Co., 504 F.2d
1062, 1065; (2d. Cir. 1974); Bulova Watch
Co., Inc. v. K. Hattori & Co. Ltd., 508
F.Supp 1322, 1346 (E.D.N.T. 1981).
*

*

*

. . . we hold that where there is joint
control of a business enterprise—similar
to that existing in a partnership or
joint venture—enough control has been
shown to establish prima facie this
particular element of agency to satisfy
long arm jurisdiction.
Cutco Ind. v. Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 366, (2d Cir. 1986).
Celia suggests that joint administration of the multi-state
silicone program should be sufficient control to treat both
Dow and the ASPRS as a single jural entity for jurisdictional purposes.
The ASPRS advances the argument that jurisdiction
is defeated because there was no profit generated by the
program.

(Respondents' Brief, p.34-36).

This argument would

deny Utah jurisdiction over any non-profit joint activity.
Jurisdiction should not hang on so slender a thread.
20

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected the
ASPRS's argument:
The district court also concluded that
FIBA's contacts with Colorado through
ABA/USA were insignificant. It based its
conclusion in part on the fact that the
concurrent activity of FIBA and ABA/USA
was not a joint "commercial" endeavor.
However, the due process clause does not
require that a foreign defendant's
contacts with the forum state be
commercial in nature. See Nova Biomedical Corp. v. Moller, 629, F.2d 190, 193
(1st Cir. 1980)(state long-arm statute
extending
jurisdiction
to federal
constitutional limits not limited to
commercial activity by defendant);
McClean v. Church of Scientology, 538
FoSupp 545, 549-50 (M.D. Fla. 1982)(commercial transaction for pecuniary benefit
not required under liberally construed
long-arm statute). Even though FIBA and
ABA/USA are not involved in a commercial
endeavor, FIBA may still conduct significant activity in Colorado through
ABA/USA
for purposes of
long-arm
jurisdiction.
Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n of U.S.A., 744 F.2d 731,
734-735 (10th Cir. 1984).

Jurisdiction extends over joint

non-commercial activity as well as commercial activity.
The ASPRS's claim that there was no contract with
Dow is refuted by Rathjen's testimony that the ASPRS agreed
to be a joint sponsor.

(Rathjen depo., R. 1812, 0.101).

Further, the minutes of the ASPRS state:
As the negotiations developed, many areas
and topics of concern were identified and
21

explained.
Agreement was reached in
every instance.
The essential features
of the program are: [etc.]
(ASPRS minutes, R. 1670)(Emphasis added).
The agreement provided for joint control of the
program by the ASPRS. (Appellants' Brief, p. 3,4).
joint control was actually exercised.
p.7).

This

(Appellant's Brief,

The claim of the ASPRS that Dow retained a veto right

over some aspects is not inconsistent with the position of
the ASPRS as a joint administration of the overall program.
As a joint sponsor, jurisdiction over the ASPRS is fair and
reasonable.

CONCLUSION
Goldwyn created substantial contacts and obligations with Celia when he acted as medical monitor.
United

States

Supreme Court has cautioned

that

The

"the Due

Process Clause may not readily be wielded as a territorial
shield to avoid interstate obligations voluntarily assumed."
Burger King, supra at 2183.
The

ASPRS

purposefully

directed

its

activities

toward Utah when it selected Utah as a site for injections
and chose a Utah doctor to perform them.

This "purposeful

direction" satisfies due process. Asahi Metal supra at 1033.
22

Furthermore, as a joint sponsor of the program with Dow, the
ASPRS

cannot

now

abandon

its

interstate

responsibility.

Jurisdiction should be exercised over Goldwyn and the ASPRS
for Celia's protection,
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EXHIBIT A

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding,

as a matter of law, that defendants Goldwyn and the ASPRS
did not cause injury to Celia in Utah?
2.

Was the trial court's conclusion that juris-

diction over Goldwyn and the ASPRS would violate federal due
process correct?

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Background.
Dow Corning tested liquid silicone for over ten

years from 1965 to 1975-

(See generally Goldwyn deposition,

R.1810, Deposition Exhibit 13, Letter of Rathjen, 10/28/33;
Rathjen depo., R.1812, p. 83-84,)

In 1975, the FDA approved

liquid

severe

silicone

deformity.

for

the

most

cases

of

facial

Dow elected not to market silicone under those

restrictions,

(IA-)

T

^e

plastic

surgeon

community

(principal users of silicone) was upset at the lack of
availability of silicone.

(Id.)

The ASPRS, on behalf of

the plastic surgeon community, approached Dow to devise a
formula to make liquid silicone available.
2.

(Id.)

Agreement to co-sponsor liquid silicone study.
The

involved

joint

formula

worked

sponsorship

out

of

2

by

a new

Dow

and

"study"

the
of

^SI RS
liquid

silicone.

(Rathjen depo., R..1812, p. 101.)

This agreement

was worked out in a series of meetings in 1976 and

xJll,

(Rathjen Depo., R.1812, p. 84-103.) The final meeting wa-.-. LJ
March 24, 1977 in Los Angeles.

(Id-, p. 99.)

Proposed

Minutes of the meeting drafted by ASPRS and Dow show Lhit
this was a formal, arms-length negotiation and agreement.
(See ASPRS minutes of 4/18/77, R.1669, attached hereto t;
Exhibit A; Dow Corning minutes of 4/11/77, R.1677, Exhibit: B
hereto; Dow Corning reply minutes of 5/18/77, Exhibit C
hereto, R.1681.)
Construing

the minutes

together,

terms of the agreement are clear.
cone,

and

the ASPRS

supplied

the

the

essential

Dow supplied the silimonitor

and

selects

physicians to perform the experiment (called the inv-sstiq.*
tors).

Dow and the ASPRS would jointly pay the expenses o«.

the medical monitor.

(Exhibit C, R.1683, Paragraph

3,r.)

They would exercise joint control over all of the docuivexc.
to be used in the study.
required on

Agreement by the ASPRS and Dow was

"all pertinent documents, L o rms , manu &.;. 6 u n J

patient releases."

(Exhibit A, Paragraph 12, R.1672).

The following is a summary of the major aspects of
the study over which the ASPRS and Dow were to share control:
(a)

Consent form (patient release) (Exhibit A,

3

Paragraph 12);
(b) Medical

monitor

selection

(Exhibit

A,

Paragraph 8(a))?
(c)

Investigators selection (Exhibit A,
Paragraph 8(b));

(d) Medical monitor - payment (Exhibit C,
Paragraph B,I) ;
(e)

Publications, panel appearances, seminars re:
liquid silicone (Exhibit A, Paragr *P.IS 7(d)
and 10(a));

(f) All pertinent documents, manuals, fens
(Exhibit A, Paragraphs 12);
(g) Medical monitor guide book (duties) (ExhibitA, Paragraph 4(d));
(h) Training seminar for investigators (Exhibit
A, Paragraph 6);
(i) Obtaining IRB approval1 (Rathjen Depo.,
R.1812,, p. 102-103) ;
(j)

Investigation location selection (Id).

^IRB: Insittutional REview Board—a body formally
designated to approve, oversee and (if necessary) terminate
experimental research on humans. See Robertson, The Lav; of
Institutional Review Boards, 26 U.C-L-A. Law Rev. 48-/
(1979), fn.4.
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3.

Activities of Medical Monitor«
Dr. Goldwyn was appointed

monitor

of

the

injectable

liquid

by the ASPR3
silicone

to be

experiment

(Goldwyn depo., R.181G, p.70, "I was asked by the president
of ASPRS").

Goldwyn's duties as monitor are partially set

forth in a letter from Arthur Rathjen (Dow Medical Liason)
to Ross Musgrave (ASPRS)•
1.

These duties include:

Act as Faculty Dean in training the investigators in the study;

2.

Approve the admission of each patient into
the experiment;

3.

Answer inquiries from investigators regarding
problems;

4.

Be the initial contact regarding complications;

5.

Assist in biannual reports to the FDA?

6.

Make

monthly

reports

to

Dow

on

patient

treatment;
7.

Review any submission to the FDA relating to
the

safety

and

efficiency

of

injectable

liquid silicone.
(See

letter

from

Rathjen,

1/7/77,

Exhibit D.)

5

R.1628,

attached

as

A critical duty which Goldwyn fulfilled was to
help draft the consent form, (Rathjen depo., R.1812, p.106
". . . The informed patient consent [form] was . . . prepared by Dr. Goldwyn and . . . the ASPRS . . • ") .
consent form had to outline
injectable liquid silicone.
(Exhibit E hereto.)

This

"the hazards involved" with
21 C.F.R. §130.37(h) (1967).

This consent form was the one used to

obtain Celia's consent to the treatment.

(Celia Anderson

depo, R.1811, Depo. Exhibit 1, Exhibit F to this brief.)
The protocol which controlled the silicone experiment

also defines the monitor's duties by reference to

federal

regulations

(Protocol,

9/2/77,

p.2,

R.1630,

"[Goldwyn's] role as medical monitor will be that defined by
FDA

regulations.").

While

these

are

not

specifically

identified, presumably they had reference to the regulations
proposed in 1977 defining a monitor's role.

Under these

regulations, a monitor must "assure that the investigator
understands the investigational status of the test article,
understands the nature of the protocol or investigational
plans and controls, and understands and accepts his obligations in conducting the clinical investigation . . . "
Fed.Reg. No. 187, p. 49623 (9/27/77).
Brief.)

42

(Exhibit G to this

After the investigation begins, the monitor assures

the investigator's "adherence to the protocol," "maintenance

6

of adequate records," and "timely, adequate and accurate"
reporting.

Ijd. at 49624.

The monitor "shall be available

for consultation at the request of the investigator.

The

monitor shall act as the liaison and communication

link

between

the

sponsor

investigator."

[Dow

and

the

ASPRS]

and

the

Id.

Goldwyn performed each of the above duties with
regard to Celia Anderson.
Celia's

injection

with

Only Dr. Goldwyn could authorize
liquid

silicone.

Dr. Woolf

has

testified:
[Goldwyn] was the one who made the decision whether there was medical necessity
for the injection.
(Woolf depo., R.1813, p.29.)

In deciding whether th^re was

medical necessity to inject liquid silicone, Dr. G:>ldwyn
reviewed Celia's medical history, her photographs, ensured
that she had signed a consent form, reviewed Celia's pacient
form, her laboratory data, and her x-rays.
R. 1810, pp.30-34.)

(Goldwyn depo.,

Based on his review, Goldwyn diagnosed

Celia as having severe lipodystrophy

(loss of fat in the

face), and specifically approved Celia for injection with
injectable

liquid

silicone.

(Goldwyn

depo.,

R.1810,

pp.110-11; Goldwyn letter, 4/19/78, R.1652.)
Goldwyn also had the responsibility to oversee the
training

program

that

Dr.

Woolf

7

attended.

(Exhibit

D,

R.1628,

Paragraph

11.)

Goldwyn

taught

the

doctors

(including Woolf) what the patient selection criteria were.
This training

program was held

in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

(Goldwyn Depo., R.1810, p. 60-62.)
After
experimental
Woolf.

Goldwyn's

series

(Woolf

of

approval,

liquid

Celia

silicone

Depo., R.1813, p.

received

injections

69-70.)

She

increasingly painful inflammation to her cheek.
70-111.)

Eventually,

she underwent major

the
from

suffered

(.Id., at p.

reconstructive

surgery to partially remove the silicone embedded in her
face.

(Id. at p. 112-122; Leonard depo., R.1811, p. 50-54.)
When Celia began to show an adverse reaction, Dr.

Woolf

reported

to Goldwyn.

updated Goldwyn on Celia's

Thereafter, Woolf

treatment, (R.1633 to

This continued for several years.
Leonard

replaced

Dr. Woolf

regularly

as

1652).

At a later stage, Dr.
the

treating

physician.

(Leonard depo., R.1811, p. 20-21.)
4.

Actual Control of ASPRS Over the Study.
The ASPRS in fact exercised joint control over the

administration of the study.

The ASPRS selected the inves-

tigators who would inject liquid silicone.
R.1812,

p.102;

course,

this

Goldwyn

included

depo.,

R.1810,

Dr. Woolf.

medical monitor, Dr. Goldwyn.

(Rathjen depo.,
pp.60,116).

The ASPRS

chose

Of
the

(Goldwyn depo., R.1810, p.70;
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Rathjen depo., R.1812, p.102.) The ASPRS ensured that the
investigators obtained approval from an Institutional Review
Board.

(Rathjen depo.f R.1812, p.102.)

Most importantly,

the ASPRS helped draft the consent form.

(Id. p.102,)

summary, the ASPRS was to "police" the study.

In

(Ijd- p.103.)

The ASPRS was held out as a co-sponsor or joint
sponsor of the liquid silicone experiment.

For example, the

letter sent to Dr. Woolf outlining the experiment represented the training seminar and

"investigational program" as

jointly administered by the ASPRS and Dow.
letter of

Dow, R.1686, Exhibit

D.)

(See 9/26/77

And Arthur

Rathjen

testified that the ASPRS was a joint sponsor of the liquid
silicone program.
5.

(Rathjen depo., R.1812, p. 101.)

ASPRS and Goldwyn Actions Directed Toward Utah.
The ASPRS and Dow jointly participated in select-

ing the geographic locations for the injection of liquid
silicone.

The actual selection was made by Dr. Peterson,

President

of

ASPRS,

and

President of the ASPRS.

Dallas

Whaley,

Executive

Vice

(Exhibit B, R.1677, Paragraph F,

7.)
Salt Lake City, Utah was specifically selected as a location for liquid silicone injection.

Dr.

Woolf,

a

Utah

doctor, was chosen by the ASPRS to inject liquid silicone in
Utah.

(Woolf depo. R.1813, p.6-7.)
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Thus, the ASPRS knew that the consent form it
helped draft would be sent to Utah, and used by a Utah
doctor, (a member of the ASPRS) to explain liquid silicone
injections to a Utah patient.

The investigators materials

were probably prepared at least in part by the ASPRS.

This

material was used to inform Dr. Woolf of the nature, hazards
and risks of injectable liquid silicone.
Goldwyn knew when he became monitor that he would
be approving silicone injections of patients in Utah.

He

helped draft the consent form he knew would be sent to those
Utah patients.

He oversaw the training given to the Utah

doctor who was to inject those patients.
6.

Defects in the Consent Form.
Celia

suffered

a

severe

reaction to the liquid silicone.

inflammatory

The risk of such a reac-

tion was well known to Dow and ASPRS.
of Daniel Bertch, R.1590.)

chronic

(Rule 56(f) Affidavit

Previous patients injected with

liquid silicone had a reaction to silicone severe enough to
require surgery. Id.

The only disclosure of that iis> in

the consent form is the statement that surgical removal may
be required if Celia's body "does not tolerate" silicone.
(Consent form, Exhibit E, Paragraph 2(e).)

What the word

"tolerate" means is not explained, nor is the suffering
which accompanies such a reaction explained.
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Furthermore,

the

ineffectiveness

of

surgical

removal was admitted by Dow to the F.D.A. (Rathjei depo.,
R.1812, Exhibit 4, p. 25.)

It is impossible to remjve all

the injected silicone, and the body continues to react to the
silicone left after surgery*

Of course, surgical removal may

leave severely disfiguring scars or require restoration of
the removed tissue by skin grafts.

This is not explained in

the consent form.
Finally, the consent form implies that the injected
silicone can be removed by needle (aspiration).
that is impossible.

Of course,

(Leonard depo. R.1811. p. 56.)

10a

